Dan Shvartsman: What are the big themes you take out of the Gaza conflict, and the initial days of the aftermath?

Dr. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman: This latest round is over. Just the way the (2nd) Lebanon War ended in summer of 2006, and since then the ceasefire has held almost perfectly, so too in this case I think that it’s fairly likely that we won’t see another round like we just saw any time soon.

What did each side achieve from this? Israel went into this determined not only to end the rocket fire, but to also change the “rules of the game”. That “Hamas shoots rockets, we shoot back,” and this tit-for-tat doesn’t change Hamas’s behavior. Beyond that, I think there was also a general desire for Israel to strengthen its deterrent posture. There was a feeling here that Israel’s deterrent posture over the last years has weakened.

I think a central goal of this operation was to send a clear message to the rest of the region and the world that it wasn’t going to allow an Iranian client-state to develop on its borders.

Hamas turned out to be far weaker than anticipated. In that regard, Israel has significantly improved its deterrent posture. It’s not just that they hit them hard, but also the incorporation of the diplomatic elements. At least on paper, the support for a change in the strategic parameters governing the Gaza area, the support for Israel’s desires is considerable. The French are patrolling off the shores of Gaza, the Americans signed a memorandum of understanding, they’re training Egyptian troops dealing with smuggling, they’re talking about interdicting Iranian ships in the Gulf of Aden.

The Egyptian participation in this sort of Western framework is a gain for Israel as well. It remains to be seen whether this framework will have real teeth and do what it’s supposed to do. So from that regard, one can say that Israel’s achievements in this operation were considerable.

They came at costs, obviously. Israel’s image has been damaged to a considerable extent among public opinion. There’s no question that more hate towards Israel will have been generated by this operation, which doesn’t bode well if you talk about the need for a long-term reconciliation.

You can even suggest the possibility that radical forces might become even stronger, particularly among Palestinians; there’s a possibility of splintering off from Hamas to represent even more Islamist, jihadi, Bin Laden-type radical views, which would make Hamas look like a positively moderate force in comparison.

Dan: How does Hamas come out of this?

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: Hamas has always had a number of different viewpoints within it. Not in ideological terms, on that they’re united. In terms of how one achieves their goals, there have been different trends. One can point to pragmatic kinds of thinking, adapting to particular circumstances.

It’s clear that there were sharp differences of opinion within Hamas over the decision to tear up the ceasefire and goad Israel into an attack, which Hamas believed was going to be beneficial – that an improved set of arrangements would be established. Clearly, that wasn’t the case; they paid a horrific price.

Hamas is likely to demonstrate a greater degree of pragmatism, to seek accommodations, to present some kind of common front with Mahmoud Abbas, so that they can then move on and say, “this is how we’re going to deal with the opening of the crossing points, the passages to ease the siege.” This is an immediate issue for Hamas, so they can engage in reconstruction, and get legitimized as an interlocutor by the international community.

It is possible that they will achieve that over time, that more and more we’ll hear voices in the West: “You need to engage in dialogue. They’re an important force. You can’t just ignore them. You have to find ways.” And that’s a double-edged sword. By Hamas engaging, they may have to modify their behavior in ways which eventually threaten to clash with their principles. On the other hand, it means that they may be getting legitimized in a way that’s to their benefit, without them giving things up.

Dan: In the whole region, a lot of interesting things came up. What’s the significance of Syria’s statements in light of the indirect negotiations with Israel before the war?

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: I was thinking about that too. On the face of it, a Syrian-Israeli agreement is much easier to achieve than a Palestinian-Israeli agreement. It’s straightforward, you deal with sovereign countries; it’s not an existential matter, per se. It’s not an inter-communal conflict on core ideological matters.

But Bashar Assad, I think, is going to be reluctant to pay the price that he has to pay for a peace treaty, which is shifting his alliance orientation: moving out of the Iranian radical camp and moving into the Western camp. I don’t think he wants to do that, I think he wants to have both: to maintain his connections with Palestinian and Lebanese forces, to maintain his connections with Iran, and to have better ties with the West, and he was trying to work through Turkey to get that.

But his militancy on these matters is very off-putting. I think it’s probably less likely also that the new Israeli government will want to pick up where the Olmert government left off. So I think we’ll probably again see a hiatus in the Israeli-Syrian track. Especially since the Turkish President has gone and alienated the Israeli political class with his behavior.

Dan: And that’s another country interesting effect of the war, Turkey’s sudden change of heart on Israel. Do you view that as a serious blow to the relationship?

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: It’s problematic. The Israeli-Turkish relationship is based on common strategic interests. The forces in Turkey that are the guardians of those strategic interests are still there.

Politically, of course, the elected leadership is an Islamist party and an Islamist government, which has a different set of considerations. And certainly a significant segment of public opinion in Turkey identified strongly with the Palestinians and is very hostile towards Israel, and we saw that during the war. This is a cause for concern. Turkey’s stance is going to be watched very, very closely.

But in any case, it’s not at all clear that the new Israeli government will give the Syrian-Israeli track a priority. I’m not so sure the Americans are going to be so keen on renewing that track either, even though there’s been a lot of advice in Washington that’s said, “go for the Syrian-Israeli track right away, because it’s more doable.” Well, I’m not sure it is.

Dan: Are you not sure because of the new Gaza conflict and the issues that were raised now? Or do you think it was the same before?

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: I was skeptical before. I’m more skeptical now. And I think because the Israeli government is about to change, that also is going to play a role here.

Now, if the Americans do get clear signals from the Syrians that they want to play, that they want this to go forward, which is very possible…everybody’s waiting for Obama. Bashar Assad’s going to want to find out where does Obama stand on this. And if he does send the appropriate signals, that will get America’s attention. And that in turn will get Israel’s attention.

Dan: What’s the significance on a broader scale that Israel, even before the war, was leaning towards Netanyahu? What does it say about the broader future prospects of Israel and peace if they’re swinging to the right?

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: You’re right about Israeli public opinion becoming more right wing, and it’s something that’s been true over the last eight years. And yet, when you ask people how they outline a settlement, you’ll find a solid majority of public opinion is in favor of a two-state solution, in favor of a centrist kind of solution, not a right wing solution. There is a consensus on that.

There’s less consensus in Israel about the kind of hard steps that Israel would have to take to help the dynamics of a diplomatic effort, particularly on settlement matters. Israelis underestimate the symbolic effect that settlement expansion has on public opinion on the other side, and also on the opinion of leadership on the other side. Continuous settlement building is seen as an example of massive Israeli bad faith. And Israelis don’t appreciate that to a sufficient degree.

With regard to the likely Netanyahu government, that also depends on the nature of his coalition. It seems very likely to me that Ehud Barak will be his Defense Minister, which means the Labor party is in the coalition.

Which means you’re talking about a center-right government, but not a right wing government. That’s a big difference. It means you have a government that can engage and will engage with Washington. Netanyahu clearly will not want to be in open confrontation with Washington. He will try to balance off the competing domestic political forces and the need to be a statesman. And that’s why Barak will be very important for him to have, and Labor.

Dan: What do you view as the likely shifts on Iran’s status? It almost seems unrelated to what just happened, but obviously it’s the elephant in the room.

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: It’s very related. I don’t know. Clearly, the U.S. administration is going to see if it can critically, and constructively, and robustly engage Iran on this matter. I think the fact that Dennis Ross has been appointed to be the point man on that, I think that’s an interesting choice, actually.

I know that Ross is a proponent of this sort of approach, robust engagement. Which means, find out what the Iranians are thinking, see what you can do, but also make sure that you have sticks as well as carrots. I think the fact that he knows the Israelis well, and the Israeli thinking well, will be an asset perhaps, to make sure the Americans understand where the Israelis are, and the Israelis understand where the Americans are.

But I don’t know where it’s going to go, and a lot of it depends on internal Iranian things, which I don’t have a good enough sense of. There’s always been a broad consensus in Iran that Iran should be a nuclear power. But that doesn’t mean that everybody’s in agreement on the path to get there, the timing, and how to respond to particular international pressures or incentives. It remains to be seen.

Dan: Would you say the same thing about the new Obama administration’s effect on the region, that it remains to be seen?

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: I think everybody expects the Americans to take a higher profile on the Israeli-Palestinian, or Arab-Israeli tracks. Nobody doubted that they would be intimately involved with the Iranian matter, and how much continuity and how much change there will be remains to be seen.

There’s a lot of expectation out there for Obama. And undoubtedly it’s exaggerated, which can lead to disappointment. But it seems to me that a lot of people in this region understand that, and want America to play a positive role here.

Dan: On both sides.

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: Yes, absolutely. The trick for the Obama Administration will be translating that desire and good will into something that makes sense for the regional actors, and makes sense for America’s interests. Big concepts, but then you have to have incremental steps. This is how things are done.

Then maybe you can look around in 2-3 years and say, “Wow, things have really moved.” As opposed to a sudden breakthrough on these issues, which are close to being intractable – but they need attention. And one hopes that they’ll receive the right kind of attention.

Dan: What do you think the overall trend in the region is, among all the different issues? Is it a positive one with incremental steps? Or will it be mostly disappointment?

Dr. Maddy-Weitzman: I think that there are some opportunities there for incremental improvement. As I said, I think that Hamas has been humbled by what happened, and that’s to the good. They’ve been taken off their high horse, even if they haven’t been crushed.

Obviously, peace isn’t around the corner. The Palestinian state-building project of the 1990s was a failure, and that’s one of the reasons why the peace process failed. What we have now are two de facto Palestinian entities, and they’re going to have to work mightily to bring a semblance of unity to their own camp. It’s essential if there’s going to be any progress on the big political issues.

Peace isn’t breaking out, that’s for sure. Let’s hope that we can start taking some positive steps, some incremental steps, and start repairing the damage that’s been caused over the last eight years.

The unabridged version of this interview is on Dan Shvartsman’s blog.

Israel is small in size of course, which is why the intractable conflict between Palestinians and Jews drags so long. But it’s also small in the way things work, as if the sort of soundstages from which America has exported its slick culture haven’t quite been built up as smoothly in Israel, so that you can see the wires from which the angels fly, the cameramen behind the screen, and the clumsy movements of the actors on and off screen.

It is inevitable that a population of 7.3 million will feel compact, as if you might run into Defense Minister Ehud Barak on the street someday and not blink. In fact, one drives by Barak’s high-rise apartment in North Tel Aviv on main highways. Without tremendous pull and with a little bit of patience and luck, a high school senior can get an interview with President Shimon Peres.

But then there is the smallness of the way the government and political parties operate. The way the war, while launched in response to the ending of a cease-fire set up long before President Obama was an inevitability, wrapped itself up tidily just before his inauguration, down to the targeting of his swearing-in ceremony as the deadline to pull out the troops. The way two of the three major parties held political primaries marred by computer breakdowns (Kadima dodged this bullet, but they also were the last party in line). The way Arab-baiting politician Avigdor Lieberman, of Yisrael Beiteinu is treated with kid gloves by his political rivals in other parties, for fear that calling him out will cost them their share of the valuable Russian vote. And then there’s the whole Arab party issue.

It’s not quite as simple as saying the Jews banned the Arab parties from the next elections out of hatred and a desire to keep the enemy down. While the Arab parties stormed out of the Central Election Committee vote to ban them chanting that Israel is, “a fascist, racist state,” there was at least a quasi-reasonable impetus for the call from Yisrael Beiteinu and another right wing party: some Arab members of the Knesset have been known to not only be sympathetic to Hamas, Hezbollah, and other “enemies of the state”, but were reported to have been in contact with those enemies. They’re also reported to have incited their constituency against this and other war efforts, and to unite in protest that at times turns violent.

Of course, that reminds the reader of plenty of other minority movements in the modern world, most obviously the Civil Rights movement in the U.S.A. that at least paved the way to our current president. If the Arabs were to manage a similar rise to near equity and open opportunity, perhaps the one-state solution wouldn’t look so imposing, and Israel would gain huge lumps of political capital, and all of a sudden the brilliant success of Israel over the last 60 years would look broader, more welcoming, and exemplary.

Instead, the country can barely see past its nose, barely past the next threat or the short term needs, which leads to three-week military poundings, Netanyahu’s return, and the banning of the main minority parties. It’s not so much that any of these decisions are on their own completely indefensible (though the last one approaches it); it’s that the big picture, the broader world’s perception, and the collection of these leanings to the right, to fear, and to paranoia all combine to make the general situation in Israel an unpromising, unpleasant one.

And it’s not just Netanyahu, for that matter: Tzipi Livni still flits back and forth between pragmatic diplomacy and militaristic posturing, and Barak, while certainly capable as a Defense Minister, has no one’s trust for the big picture. There is no uniting outsider force that can take Israel to a better place, whether through peace or through some cohesive security policy.

The country seems untroubled by its increasing international isolation, an attitude perhaps born out of 60 years of making it work underneath improbable, impossible circumstances. If we’ve made it this far, goes the thinking, who the hell is going to stop us? And why change what we’re doing?

The smallness permeates the region, there’s no denying that. Hamas’s efforts to declare victory while still trumpeting their tragedy, the constant side-choosing between Egypt and Syria, and Hezbollah’s saber-rattling, all part and parcel to the region’s problems. But Israel relies on its democratic roots, its troubled past, and its supposed moral superiority to act in a strong and bold way to protect itself. Those grounds are challenged when they go as far as to bar the main representatives to the minorities in their own country.

Kernels of hope exist. For one, the ban was quickly overturned. A recent poll suggests that the majority of Israelis want peace. And then there’s everybody’s favorite deus ex machina, President Obama, who might just swoop in and impose peace on all of us. Considering the candidates for Israeli PM are approaching a “six in one basket, half dozen in the other” phase, this may be our only hope, the only change to believe in, and the only way to break us out of our smallness. Which leaves us fighting for our turn in line along with the rest of the world.

The problems strike me when I drive in the north and see the Russian language campaign ads for Tzipi Livni. Livni, the centrist, supposedly noble candidate of Kadima, has responded to snide comments and allaying Russian-immigrant fears about her gender by advertising her “manhood to change the country.” In Hebrew, the ad substitutes “manhood” for “guts.” Either way, she has something to prove in this war.

They strike me when I read editorials from international news sources or take comments from friends back home, who think this war was calculated to take advantage of the last space before Barack Obama comes to power, or of the run-up to the February elections, or the Christmas season lull. It has nothing to do with that, I insist: When Israel and Hamas made their truce last summer, Obama’s presence was hardly inevitable, and Hamas was the one firing rockets in the week after the ceasefire ended. At the very least, Israel is fighting for their own security reasons and not out of bald-faced political opportunism, I contest. But the longer the war drags on, the more I doubt.

The problems strike me when I talk to my grandparents in the States. My grandparents have all the free time in the world to follow Russian-language news from Israel; they are the type of elderly Jews who feared Obama for his purported Islamic background and his likely support of the Palestinians.

They ask me on Skype about my safety, but a minute later state their undying support for Israel, their opinion that Hamas should be destroyed, and that all Israelis are heroes. I think about my mechanic screwing me over or how Israelis drive and bite my tongue.

And there’s little reason to fear my safety, nestled in a cosmopolitan suburb of Tel Aviv, a long 80 KMs from Gaza. Working in an American school even farther north (though not far enough north to be in reach of Hezbollah, if they should decide to join in), I operate in a circle that is not only secure but also completely isolated from the war. Sure, in the lunch room the topic comes up, but being as I don’t speak Hebrew well, I could more or less completely shut out the war if I didn’t get the newspaper each morning.

The problem isn’t quite that, of course: I’m grateful I’m safe and not eager for danger. It’s that much of the country supports the war, and the Hebrew-language press drums up patriotism, and yet no one is really affected by it. While the Gazans’ poverty-stricken lives have now received a new dollop of war, pain, and death, the majority of Israel runs as usual. People watch the news a little bit more and worry about their relatives or friends serving in the army, but the level of tragedy is drastically unbalanced.

It goes beyond justification. Hamas provoked us, they fired rockets, they rejected the cease-fire, they still vow to wipe Israel off the planet, and hence Hamas deserves what they get: that may all be true, but isn’t enough to account for civilian suffering. “But Gazans voted for Hamas and so earned punishment!” – Such is the counter-argument. I think that’s like saying that Americans abroad all deserved ass-kickings because of Bush’s policies.

Most essentially, the imbalance reminds me of a talk I had with my college coach. He, a devout but very open-minded and playfully argumentative Christian, asked me why the Darwin fish is so condoned, seeing how offensive it is to Christianity, a mockery of a symbol hearkening back to a time when being Christian was a dangerous thing.

The only response I could come up with was that when you’re the majority, sometimes you have to overlook the slings and arrows fired against you. When a student teases a teacher, a little brother his older sibling, the responsibility of the more powerful figure is to rise above the slight, meting out discipline only when necessary and productive, without stooping to the level of the weaker party.

In all respects, Hamas is this weaker party. They have much blood on their hands, and are arguably as culpable as Israel in this conflict, if not more so, but it doesn’t matter. From our safe homes we can cheer or protest, plan to support right wing Bibi Netanyahu or left wing war leader Ehud Barak, and call for help from abroad or declare our right to defend ourselves. But Israel, the Israel I live in and most of the country lives in, is not suffering, is not under wartime conditions, and the level of sacrifice there is in the country doesn’t match the pain of our enemies.

So we proceed into week 3, with daily reports about ceasefire resolutions or proposals that show promise but don’t do enough, or that don’t concern us, or that give Hamas too much, and a growing consensus from the military that it’s time to either shit (take out Hamas) or get off the pot (impose our own cease-fire). And from my safe, naïve little neck of the country, getting off the pot can’t happen soon enough, before the real shitstorm begins.

The problem is, it’s probably too late.

In the days leading up to the Israeli Air Force air strike, as Palestinian militants launched more and more rockets in an effort to induce a new cease-fire from Israel, under better terms than the one that expired December 19th, Israeli politicians wavered between preaching patience and calling for attacks, with both sides appearing to have the February elections in mind.

On Christmas, it appeared the calm might extend a little longer: Ehud Barak appeared on a comedy show in Israel (something akin to SNL, and he did a fine job ribbing himself, by all reports), and a news story floated in national newspapers that soldiers were instructed to use up their vacation days this year, because they wouldn’t transfer over to the next year.

Perhaps thinking themselves so clever, Barak and co. then ordered the air strike last Saturday that indeed shocked the Gazans and has lit up the world. And things haven’t slowed down yet.

It should be said that political considerations appear to be out of the picture so far, as Ahron Bregman pointed out in his interview. War in any case will benefit the right wing, and hence the opposition leader and election front runner Benjamin Netanyahu. Ehud Olmert is on his way out and his hoped-for legacy of peace has been postponed, at the least. Tzipi Livni, fresh off a declaration of war principles in Paris, stands to lose out in this war politically anyway, not only because Netanyahu benefits but because her rival on the left, Barak, is running the campaign and stands to gain the most from success. Barak’s actions should be watched to see if he gets greedy in his aims, but for now, he has been restrained.

That said, the objectives of this mission have remained vague. Every pertinent Israeli leader has stated their disinterest in occupying Gaza or waging a long-term ground war. The goal is to weaken Hamas and get them to sue for a cease-fire, allowing Israel to impose better conditions (no rocket fire, for one), but Hamas is nothing if not prideful. And the balance between bringing Hamas to their knees with pinpointed assassinations and enraging them with 400 deaths, a quarter of which the U.N. estimates are civilians, is a very delicate one that Israel has struggled with in the past.

Mainstream Israelis have two sets of memories fueling their views on the conflict. On the one hand, the constant stream of rockets was becoming intolerable even at a low level, and the increase pushed Israel over the brink. “It was too much, I’m glad we’re attacking,” a cab driver told me Sunday, then complaining about Russia’s call for peace by referencing Georgia. “[The war’s] no good, but it’s scary, a rocket hit the house next to mine,” a girl on the train said to me about Beersheeva. Even the leftist Haaretz editorial page acknowledged that time had come to strike, if in a limited fashion.

While the tempers are high, however, in the back of everybody’s mind is the failed war against Lebanon of two years ago. Hezbollah was stronger than Hamas is now, but the failure to damage the operation – in fact, Israel emboldened and strengthened Hezbollah – lingers as a warning for this time around. World opinion also flew in the face of Israeli efforts, and while there is broad support or condoning for Israel now, any significant continuation is bound to harm Israel’s world status again.

So the country is of two minds as we watch the news and the problems in the South. Life goes on with no bumps in central and northern Israel. The citizens watch with battle-hardened anxiety, glad for the “punishment” of Hamas forces but uneager to face the consequences. The political leaders grapple with whether sending in the ground troops will be worth the casualties and swing in opinion, or if enough has been done.

The whole Gaza situation has taken a sick turn in the past two weeks, and the fear is that a certain eerie resonance to two years ago will linger. One can only hope that the Olmert-Livni-Barak trio will decide enough is enough on time, before that echo grows to a roar.